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the fact that it invites customers to bring their motor vehicles
onto its premises and provides employees to load them. 2 The
vehicle must be owned and operated by the business, said the
court, and the fact that the business exposes its employees to the
operation of vehicles of third parties is not enough.
This is rather startling in view of the liberality with which
our courts have previously regarded the entire subject of hazardous businesses and employments. They have held that even
the occasional use of a vehicle is sufficient to bring a business
within the coverage of the act.8 Loaders and riders, as well as
drivers, have been included. 4 It now appears that drive-in theatres and curb service establishments may well be excluded from
compensation coverage, although these businesses expose their
employees to the danger of the operation of automobiles with
much more frequency and severity than many businesses or
trades that have been included without question. Furthermore,
the act requires only that the business must "entail ...the operation of . . .engines and other forms of machinery." 5 The dictionary defines "entail" as "to involve as a necessary accompaniment or result." It seems that when a proprietor so arranges his
premises as to encourage others to bring their vehicles there and
when he profits from the regular presence and use of such vehicles his business may fairly be said to "entail" the operation of
motor vehicles, even though his own employees do not drive
them.

II. Public Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*

RENT CONTROLS

It is not difficult to view the decision in the Sheffield
appeal' as a reasonable disposition of a tangled factual situation
and to accept it as such. Viewed as it must be, however, as an
instance of enforcement action under the Emergency Price Con2. Fields v. General Casualty Co. of America, 216 La. 940, 45 So. 2d 85
(1950).
3. Collins v. Spielman, 200 La. 586, 8 So. 2d 608 (1942); Richardson v.
American Employers' Insurance Co., 31 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 1947).
4. Snear v. Eiserloh, 144 So. 265 (La. App. 1932).
5. La. R.S. (1950) 23:1035.

* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Sheilleld v. Jefferson Parish Developers, Inc., 216 La. 1055, 45 So. 2d
621 (1950).
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trol Act, 2 there are aspects of the decision upon which some reflection is warranted.
The suit was brought by a tenant for treble damages under
Section 925 (e) of the act alleging wilful charges in excess of rent
ceilings fixed by the regional rent director. The tenant's demands
were dismissed by the trial court. The court of appeals for
Orleans Parish reinstated the demands and directed judgment
for tenants for twice the overcharges, finding wilful violation
and a lack of care to prevent the occurrence of violations.,3 On
review by the supreme court the judgment was reduced to the
amount of the overcharges, the court finding, on the basis of
certain unofficial statements by government employees considered by the court of appeals as without probative effect, that the
landlord did not wilfully violate the statute.
A rent director probably would have been most unhappy
over the outcome of the Sheffield appeal were it to be a precedent
for the turbulent years of 1942-45. In 1950 it does not make as
4
much difference, or at least it does not thus far in 1950.
Under the enforcement provisions of the Price Control Act
a violator of price regulations subjects himself to the possibility
of paying to the tenant as much as three times the amount of
the overcharge, limited to the amount of the overcharge only if
he can prove that the violation was neither wilful nor the result
of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence
of the violation. The excess payment which the landlord may
find himself compelled to make to the tenant has significance, of
course, not in making the tenant whole but in its punitive effect
on violators and its deterrent effect on prospective violators.
The status of the defendant against whom suit was brought
is significant in analyzing the decision in its character as a punitive enforcement measure. The action for treble charges here is
against a corporate landlord who was placed in voluntary liquidation proceedings subsequent to institution of suit. Since the need
for an example and for sharp pecuniary punishment of a violation of rent ceilings had presumably long since gone by the board,
the full statutory penalty against an insolvent corporate landlord
2. 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. 901, 925.
3. 37 So. 2d 729 (La. 1948).
4. The President has recently announced the appointment of a new price
administrator. New wage and price controls are scheduled for priority consideration in the current Congress. Since rent controls have never been
fully removed, it is probable that the rent control organizations could quickly
be restored to its war-time operating proportions. See 59 Stat. 306; 50 App.
U.S.C.A. § 901, 902, Executive Order No. 9745, 11 Fed. Reg. 7327 (1946).
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represented in 1950 little more than a redistribution of creditors'
interests in the estate to war-time tenants.
It is difficult to attribute wilful disregard of rent ceilings to
the corporate officials here. They had gone through a long paper
bout with Washington incident to getting priorities for materials
from the War Production Board and its sub-agency, the National
Housing Agency.5 Having once settled the rental question with
the Board, they found it unsettled for them by a sub-agency of
National Housing, the Federal Housing Authority, incident to
approving financing and related matters the Authority required
revision of the plans to provide for larger units with commensurately larger building costs. However, the Authority gave only
unofficial encouragement to an increase over the rents previously
settled upon.
The officials filed a schedule of the higher rents in which
they had been given some encouragement by the Authority; the
area rent director, having only official information as to the
lower rents approved initially by the War Production Board,
issued orders putting the latter rents into effect as ceilings. 6 The
higher rentals filed continued to be charged by the corporation
despite the rent director's order. The good faith of the corporate
officials in pursuing this course would turn, presumably, on their
belief that a correcting order would shortly issue from the Federal Housing Authority. But no protest was filed with the price
administrator against the rent order 7 and consequently no appeal
was taken to the Emergency Court of Appeals.8 Nor was protest
made or appeal taken in 1944 when the area rent director again
refused to make any retrospective adjustment in the rents and
when hope of further Federal Housing Authority action must
have been pretty thoroughly abandoned.
A protest against the rent orders timely filed with the Administrator in either 1942 or 1944 might well have been the basis for
setting the record straight forthwith. In any event it would have
laid the basis for an appeal to the emergency court with prompt
disposition assured under the statute, the judges of both federal
district and circuit courts being available for the constitution of
such emergency courts." To ignore the statutory opportunities
for making certain that which was uncertain and to continue
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Executive Order No. 9070, 7 Fed. Reg. 1529 (1942).
Rent Regulation for Housing, § 4 (f), 8 Fed. Reg. 7323 (1943).
50 U.S.C.A. 923 (a).
50 U.S.C.A. 924 (a).
50 U.S.C.A. 924 (c).
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rentals in excess of a final rent order seems hardly to constitute
having taken the precautions which were practicable against the
occurrence of a violation; even though wilful disregard of the
statute did not prompt their action. And in the turbulent era for
which the statute was drawn rent directors needed sanctions
against "conscionable" as well as "unconscionable" violators.
ADMINISTRArIVE RULE-MAKING

In reviewing the decision of the Orleans court of appeal in
Melancon v. Mizell, 10 a suit against a pest-control operator and
his surety company for non-performance of a contract, the court
has occasion this term to construe the rule-making and bonding
provisions of the statute governing pest-control operators, now
administered by the Pest Control Commission."
Attractive as is the good-will building potential of the "guaranteed" termite job, it was to be expected that the "guarantee"
appeal would be used by many sporadic and transient operators
unwilling or unable to make good on such guarantees freely
promised and given in the flush of business-getting. It seems
probable that unhappy experiences with such "guarantees"
prompted initial legislative attempts to give the home-owner
more assurance that the guarantee would be backed up by ability
to perform thereon. The earliest statute on the subject, in fact,
contained a provision requiring, in connection with licensing
pest control operators, that licensees furnish $500 bond payable
to the chairman of the Horticultural Commission as assurance
2
that licensee's operations would be honestly conducted.'
In subsequent years the mandatory requirement as to bond
was modified to make its requirement discretionary in the commission with the maximum requirement fixed at $10,000." A
few years of exercising commission discretion on a point of such
delicacy evidently persuaded those administering the act and
those affected by it that this was not a satisfactory mode of procedure; in 1942 the requirement was again made mandatory and
was fixed at a uniform amount of $2,000. 4 The provision was
re-enacted in the Revised Statutes of 1950.15
The present statute also vests in the Commission the power
to "make rules and regulations governing the making and issu10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

216 La. 711, 44 So. 2d 826 (1950).
La. R.S. (1950) 40:1261-1274.
La. Act 57 of 1930, § 4.
La. Act 41 of 1936, § 4.
La. Act 124 of 1942, § 6.
La. R.S. (1950) 40:1268.
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ance of licenses for each particular type of pest control and the
qualifications of applicants."'6 Earlier legislation limited the
objectives of rule-making by the commission to the prevention
of fraudulent practices but inserted no broader statement of
objectives for Commission rule-making.
The error alleged by counsel in the Melancon case and the
basis for the court of appeal's affirmance of dismissal of the suit
on exception of no cause of action, was that the bond requirements approved by the commission went beyond the authority
of the statute in requiring a bond that the principal would perform his contract in all its terms and provisions. The specific
provision of the statute is, as noted, that the principal shall give
bond conditioned on his honestly conducting his business. A
majority of the court found that there was a legislative intent
as urged in this appeal authorizing the commission to require a
bond assuring faithful performance of contracts. The case was
accordingly remanded to the district court for trial on its merits.
One justice dissented, one took no part, and one concurred on
the ground that there was fraud shown so that there was no
need to construe broadly the commission's powers.
The 1942 amendments which struck the limitations from the
rule-making power of the commission are interpreted by the
court as broadening that power. Further, the court infers that,
having taken this step, the legislature did not intend the language of the provision requiring bond that the operator would
honestly conduct his operations to be construed as a bond only
against fraud in such operations. As the court notes, "it is possible that the legislature in said Section 6 [§1268, Revised Statutes] used the words 'honestly conduct said business' in a broad
sense, intending thereby (as it might well have done in view of
the mentioned definition [of honest]) not only to prevent fraudulent practices but also to insure a just and sincere carrying out
of the work undertaken by the business."
Certainly this meaning could be attributed to the terms of
Section 1268 taken by itself. When considered, as the court does,
in the context of the rule-making power having been broadened
from rule-making for the prevention of fraud to general rulemaking power, it appears comfortably within the legislative
intent.
This decision has given the commission an interpretation of
its rule-making power which should enable it to improve further
16. Id. at § 1265.
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the ethical level of pest control operations; to serve merely as a
guardian against outright fraud and as a limiting agent in the
free play of competition would hardly justify its operations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CharZes A. Reynard*

The past term produced the customary share of decisions
involving constitutional issues. One of them, of extraordinary
significance, represents an apparent shift in the court's approach
to problems of substantive due process.' Two less significant
cases involved additional aspects of the due process clause as
well as the commerce clause and freedom of speech and the
press. Constitutional issues were also presented in three tax
cases 2 which are discussed in the section devoted to State and
Local Taxation.
In Schwegmann Brothers v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic
Beverage Control,3 by far the most important constitutional law
case of the term, the court set the hands of the judicial clock
back twenty years when it declared that the price-fixing provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 19484 "are manifestly unreasonable within the contemplation of the state's police
power, and, hence, are unconstitutional in that they violate the
due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions."'. This,
to the knowledge of the writer, is the first decision of the court
to invalidate legislation on the ground of substantive due process
since 1930;6 it is the only one in its history to reject price-fixing
as a legitimate device for the regulation of the state's economic
welfare. Three other price-fixing statutes enacted by the legis* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
2. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113

(1950); State ex rel. Fontenot, Collector of Revenue v. Standard Dredging

Corp., 216 La. 509, 43 So. 2d 909 (1949); and DiGiovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La.

687, 44 So. 2d 818 (1950).
3.
4.
5.
6.

See discussion of these cases, infra p. 214 et seq.

216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
La. Act 360 of 1948 (La. R.S. [1950] 26:1 et seq.).
216 La. 148, 182, 43 So. 2d 248, 259 (1949).
In City of Alexandria v. Hall, 171 La. 595, 131 So. 722 (1930), believed

to be the last decision to invalidate a regulation of economic affairs, the
court had held that "the requirement in the ordinance that barber shops
shall be closed at 6:30 p.m .... is not really an appropriate measure for the
protection of the public health, as the alleged necessity for the restriction in
the ordinance bears no reasonable relation to public health, is not supported
by anything of substance, but rests, in our opinion, upon mere conjecture."
171 La. 595, 601-602, 131 So. 722, 724. The statement in the text does not take
tax or license cases into account. Cf. State v. Lucas, 196 La. 299, 199 So. 126
(1940).

